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DICTA

SECURITY TRANSACTIONS AND THE
CONFLICT OF LAWS
ALLEN P. MITCHEM
Assistant Professor, University of Denver College of Law

While the new Certificate of Title Act I which was enacted by
the Colorado legislature last year has eliminated many of the pitfalls of residents of this state who purchase or otherwise acquire
interests in automobiles, it will have little effect in resolving the
conflicts between interest acquired as a result of transactions occurring in Colorado and prior interests which arose in another state if
the motor vehicles involved were registered in the other state. This
conflict of laws problem still remains. This problem, of course, is
not confined to interests in automobiles, but it may involve any
chattel which is removed from one state to another. Discussion of
the problem, however, is usually in terms of automobiles because
they are the chattels in which rights have been asserted in most
of the decided cases. This is true undoubtedly as a result of the
comparative ease with which an automobile may be removed from
one state to another.
A hypothetical case may serve to introduce the problem. Jones
buys a car in State X either under a conditional sale contract
wherein title is retained by the Brown Motor Company (the
vendor) until all payments are completed, or by giving the Brown
Motor Company a chattel mortgage to secure the unpaid balance,
either type of transaction being recognized as valid under the law
of State X. Thereafter, without the knowledge or consent of the
Brown Motor Company, Jones removes the car to Colorado where
interests in the car are asserted by attaching creditors of Jones,
or by a subsequent purchaser, mortgagee, or other lien holder, each
of whom acquired his interest without notice of the outstanding
interest which was created by the out of state security transaction.
The issue maybe stated as follows: Will the Colorado courts recognize the interest acquired by Brown Motor Company by virtue
of the transaction which took place in State X while the car was
located in that state?
The issue thus presented should be carefully distinguished
from the non-conflicts situation where the original transaction between Jones and Brown Motor Company took place in this state at
a time when the car was situated here. In such an event, the Colorado courts should unquestionably determine the rights of the various parties in accordance with the internal law of this state.
I COLO. STAT. ANN., C. 16, § 13 (Supp. 1949).
For a summary of this Act, see Hellerstein, Certificate of Title Law Effective August 1, 26 DICrA 175 (July, 1949).
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COLORADO LAW APPLICABLE IN NON-CONFLICTS SITUATIONS

Before proceeding to an analysis of the conflicts situation presented in the hypothetical problem, it might prove helpful to consider momentarily some of the established rules of Colorado law
which would be applied to conditional sales and chattel mortgages
which had no contacts outside the state.
While there are significant differences in the nature of the
rights which arise between parties to chattel mortgages on the one
hand and parties to conditional sale contracts on the other hand,2
the Colorado courts have held that regardless of whether the instrument used be a conditional sale contract, chattel mortgage,
lease, trust deed, or other form, if it is intended to have the effect
of a mortgage or lien upon the property, it must be acknowledged
and filed for record. If this is not done, the property must be delivered to and remain in the possession of the vendor-mortgagee
before his rights will be superior to those of third parties who,
without notice, subsequently acquire an interest in the property.3
While it may be doubted that conditional sales are "intended to
have the effect of a mortgage or lien," 4 it is thus established that
they do have that effect as to third parties who subsequently acquire
rights without notice, and as to such third parties, they are given
the effect of absolute or unconditional sales.
It should be noted that the above rules became established in
reliance upon statutory provisions 5 no longer applicable to motor
vehicles which are subject to the new Certificate of Title Act.
However, that Act, which requires the existence of any "mortgage"
on a motor vehicle to be noted on the owner's certificate of title or
bill of sale in addition to being filed for public record, 7 defines
"mortgages" as including "chattel mortgages, conditional sales,
contracts, or any other like instrument intended to operate as a
mortgage or create a lien on a motor vehicle as security for an
undertaking of the owner." 8 It may thus be inferred that the Act
dealt only with the method of giving notice and left undisturbed
the previous holdings which refused to differentiate between chattel
mortgages and conditional sales with regard to the necessity of
giving notice to third persons.
THE THEORY OF THE CONFLICT OF LAW RULE

If it be assumed that the above is a correct statement of the
internal law of Colorado, it must be conceded that the law of most
other states is different, particularly with reference to conditional
'HELLERSTEIN,

CHATTEL MORTGAGES IN COLORADO, § 2 (3rd ed. 1940).

'Illinois Co. v. Patterson, 91 Colo. 391, 15 P. 2d 699 (1932) ; Coors v. Reagan, 44
Colo. 126, 96 P. 966 (1908). The chattel mortgage (or conditional sale) will, however,
be valid as'between the parties thereto, COLO. STAT. ANN., c. 32, § 4 (1935), or as to
third parties with actual notice, COLO. STAT. ANN., c. 32, § 5 (1935).
'See Mr. Justice Butler dissenting in Illinois Co. v. Patterson, 91 Colo. 391, 408,
15 P. 2d 699, 705 (1932).
'COLO.

.COLO.
7 Ibid.

STAT. ANN.,
STAT. ANN.,

c. 32, §1 and § 20 (1935).
c. 16, § 13 (18)
(Supp. 1949).

Old. c. 16, § i(2)(m).
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sale contracts, which, in the absence of express statutes to the
contrary, are recognized as valid even against third persons
without notice. As was pointed out by the dissenting justices
in a Colorado case decided in 1932, 9 in the purchase of personal
property, the rule of caveat emptor ordinarily applies. Thus, a
lessee of chattels cannot, as against the lessor, pass title by sale
thereof even to a bona fide purchaser who has no notice of the lessor's title. Nor can a bailee or agent by his wrongful sale pass title
to a third person so as to cut off the interest of the bailor or
principal.
Consequently, it may be supposed that under the law of the
hypothetical State X, there is no statutory requirement for recording
the conditional sale contract or chattel mortgage, or it may be supposed that there is such a requirement and that the instrument has
been recorded in accordance with the law of State X. In either
case, the result is the same, i.e. Brown Motor Company's interest
is protected and superior to that of creditors of Jones, at least so
long as the automobile remains in State X.
Upon the removal of the car to Colorado and upon assertion
of rights therein by Jones' creditors or a subsequent vendee, it
becomes necessary to choose between the law of State X and of
Colorado. Except as a state may have to alter it to meet requirements of statutory or constitutional law, a state may select any
choice of law rule which it wishes. However, the foremost objective of conflict of law rules is to prevent the outcome of litigation
from varying solely because of the place chosen to institute the
suit. This objective is dictated by reasons of fairness to all parties
concerned. It will be conceded that this objective is not always
attained; nevertheless, it is an objective which should be constantly
in mind in the application of any choice of law rule.
There appears to be no constitutional compulsion that either
the law of State X or the law of Colorado be applied in the problem
at hand. While it has been urged by respectable authority that
the state to which the chattel has been wrongfully removed has no
jurisdiction to divest the owner of his interest in the chattel, 10
such a view has not found general acceptance. If the chattel is in
the second state, that state has power over such chattel, and it
seems that the second state can apply its own law to determine the
interests of persons therein. 1 Nor does the Full Faith and Credit
Clause 12 require the choice of State X law, there having been no
judicial determination of the rights of the parties in that state.
It appearing that either choice of law is open to the Colorado
court, the first step normally taken by the forum (Colorado) is that
9 Illinois Co. v. Patterson, 91 Colo. 391, 415, 15 P. 2d 699, 705 (1932).
10 Beale, Jurisdiction Over Title of Absent Owner, 40 HARv. LAW Rev. 805 (1927).
1 Compare RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS, § 268 and § 275 (1934) for the suggestion that the interests of the mortgagee or conditional vendor are not divested as a
result of any dealings in the second state but that dealings with the chattel in a state
into which it is taken without consent of the mortgagee or conditional vendor may
result in new liens which have preference over the mortgage or conditional title.
1

U.

S. CoNsT. ART. 4, § 1.
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of characterization. This involves a determination of the legal
nature of the problem. Is it one of tort, contract, property, etc.?
The answer to this question will be determined by reference to the
concepts of the forum. The problem at hand concerns interests in
property which were created by contract. If the mortgagee or conditional vendor was trying to enforce a personal obligation created
by the contract, a court where the action was brought might easily
justify the conclusion that the legal nature of the problem was the
validity of the contract, in which case the Colorado court would
undoubtedly apply the law of the place of contracting, 13 State X.
Where, however, the controversy in the second state involves
primarily claims of parties to interests in the chattel, as it does
in this hypothetical situation, the courts will characterize the problem as one of property. The governing law then becomes the law
14
of the state where the property was at the time of the transaction.
It may thus be seen that when the transaction took place in State
X at a time when the property was located in that state, regardless
of whether the problem was characterized as one of contracts or
of property, the rights of the parties should normally be determined
by the law of State X.
While this result is not reached because of any constitutional
compulsion and rests upon principles of so-called comity, there is
a great deal of merit in the rule. No state other than State X had
any concern in the matter at the time the interests of the parties
arose.
CONFLICT CASES IN THE COLORADO COURTS

The references to the usual choice of law rules in the preceding paragraphs should not be understood as expressing the choice
of law rules usually applied in the Colorado courts. On the contrary, the decided cases in this state seem to indicate that the
Colorado law differs in this respect from that of most other states.
The first reported conflicts case wherein this type of problem
arose was Harper v. People.15 In that case the court upheld the
right of a conditional vendor against a domestic attaching creditor,
the conditional sale contract having been entered into in.Kansas.
The court was careful to note a distinction between this conflicts
case and an earlier non-conflicts case 16 wherein the conditional
sale was made in this state. The court in the Harper case stated
that wherever the lex loci contractus and the situs of the property
unite to sustain the validity of the contract, "it may be safely asserted that it is enforceable in the courts of every
state where a
17
controversy arises over the title to the property."
' Cockburn v. Kinsley, 25 Colo. App. 89, 135 P. 1112 (1913).
, RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS, § 265 and § 272 (1934).
U2 Colo. App. 177, 29 P. 1040 (1892).
"0George v. Tufts, 5 Colo. 162 (1869).
1 Harper v. People, supra at 179, 29 P. at 1040.
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Similar treatment was given in a 1920 case 18 to a chattel
mortgage on a truck which, although the sale and mortgage were
executed in Colorado, was described in the mortgage as being situated in Nebraska. The chattel mortgage was valid in Nebraska,
where it had been recorded, and it was therefore held valid and
enforceable in Colorado, even though the facts indicated that the
occasional removal to Colorado was with mortgagee's consent.
From these two cases, one might have concluded in 1920 that
regardless of the conditions that the internal law of Colorado would
have imposed upon the conditional vendor or mortgagee for the
protection of his interest, if that interest had arisen as a result of
a transaction in this state involving chattels here located, Colorado
would respect similar interests which had arisen in a sister state
and which were valid by the law of such state.
This seemingly harmonious state of affairs was soon shattered
insofar as conditional sales were concerned, however, by the much
discussed case of Turnbull v. Cole.19 The facts in that case were
that defendant's assignor had sold a car to one Keightley in Utah
by virtue of a contract reserving to the vendor the right to take
possession of the car upon default in payments and to sell it. The
contract appeared to impose upon the purchaser an unconditional
obligation to pay the agreed price; however,' under the law of Utah,
the contract was regarded as a conditional sale which did not pass
title. Utah law did not require the recording of such a contract
in order to protect the interest of the vendor. The car was subsequently removed from Utah without the knowledge or consent
of the vendor, brought to Colorado, and sold to Bell, who mortgaged
it to Cole to secure a note for $600.
In a 4-3 decision sustaining the interest of the subsequent
mortgagee, Cole, the Colorado court said:
... Contracts like that here under consideration, reserving a
secret lien " to the vendor, will not be recognized as leaving title in
the vendor, as against interested parties without notice. . . . The
contract, though valid in Utah, could not be enforced in this state,
because such action would be contrary to public policy, and would
result in detriment to the interests of a citizen of this state. Both
of these grounds furnish exceptions to the general rule of comity
as applied to the enforcement of contracts.

It will be seen that the Colorado court here recognized that the
"general rule of comity" would require the enforcement of contracts validly entered into in a sister state. The validity of the
grounds for exception will be discussed later.
The case of Turnbull v. Cole was followed in two subsequent
cases 21 wherein the rights of conditional vendors (arising in other
states from transactions which, although unrecorded, were valid
':Flora v. Julesburg Motor Co., 69 Colo. 238, 193 P. 545 (1920).
" 70 Colo. 364, 201 P. 887 (1921).
0 Emphasis added.
" American Equitable Assurance Co. v. Hall, 93 Colo. 186, 24 P. 2d 980 (1933)
Commercial Credit Co. v. Higbee, 92 Colo. 346, 20 P. 2d 543 (1933).
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by the laws of such states) were denied recognition. On the other
hand, in the intervening case of Mosko v. Matthews 22 the Colorado
court gave recognition to the interest of an Oklahoma mortgagee
in a car which had been mortgaged in Oklahoma, the chattel mortgage being recorded in that state, and subsequently removed to
Colorado without the knowledge or consent of the mortgagee.
Despite the language in these cases which indicated that the
interests of the vendors were not recognized because conditional
sale contracts create a "secret lien" which is against the public
policy of Colorado, whereas the interest of a mortgagee who had
recorded his mortgage would be recognized, it was urged that there
was a more satisfactory explanation for the different treatment
given in the Colorado courts to these two types of transactions.
This explanation is well stated in the Colorado Annotations to the
Restatement of Conflict of Laws as follows :23
It is submitted that the rule of Turnbull v. Cole should be restricted to cases in which the conditional sale contract is not filed
or recorded in the state of the original situs. There is no evidence
*

.

. (that such) ...

contracts were so recorded. The danger of in-

jury to citizens of Colorado is no greater in the case of a conditional
sale contract recorded in the state of original situs but not in Colo-

rado than in the case of a chattel mortgage recorded in the same
way.

In the more recent case of Castle v. Commercial Investment
Trust Corp.,2 4 however, this seemingly logical explanation of the
Colorado position was repudiated. There the conditional sale contract which had been executed in New York was recorded in New
York. The subject of the sale, a car, was later removed to Colorado
without the consent of the vendor plaintiff. In holding that a bona
fide purchaser in Colorado had a claim superior to that of the New
York vendor, the court was content to state that the comity rule
does not extend to such a contract as the one there involved. Evidently the court found itself unable to support the position that the
plaintiff had a "secret lien" which was repugnant to the public
policy of Colorado, the conditional sale contract having been made
a public record which was "notice to the world"; however, no other
explanation was given for the decision.
The most recent Colorado case 25 dealing with a conditional
sale contract entered into in another state shed no light upon the
problem here under discussion, for there the Colorado purchaser
from the conditional vendee had actual notice of the limited interest
of the conditional vendee. The court, therefore, recognized the
title of the conditional vendor.
CRITIQUE OF THE COLORADO POSITION
From the foregoing discussion, it would seem that the following conclusions could be safely drawn from the Colorado cases:
2 87 Colo. 55, 284 P. 1021 (1930).
2 Annotation to § 272 (1936).
2100
Colo. 191, 66 P. 2d 804 (1937).
25 Reavis v. Stockel, 120 Colo ......
208

P. 2d 94 (1949).
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(1) The rights accruing to a mortgagee from a chattel mortgage
executed in State X while the chattel was there situated will be
recognized in Colorado even as against third parties without notice, provided that the mortgage was recorded in and valid under
the law of State X. (2) The rights of the mortgagee in (1) above
probably would not be recognized in Colorado if the mortgage was
unrecorded in State X (even assuming that such a transaction was
valid as against third parties by the law of State X) because of the
Colorado abhorrence of "secret liens". (3) The title of a conditional
vendor will not be recognized in Colorado as against third parties
without notice where the conditional sale was executed in State X
while the chattel was there situated even if the contract was recorded in and valid under the law of State X. (4) As between the
contracting parties or as against third persons with actual notice,
the rights accruing in State X to either a conditional vendor or
mortgagee will be recognized in Colorado regardless of whether
the contract was recorded in State X, provided such contract was
valid according to the law of State X.
The primary quarrel that the writer has with the position of
the Colorado courts concerns the second and third statements
above, particularly the third. It should be remembered that in all
the foregoing discussion, it was assumed that the removal of the
chattel to Colorado was without the knowledge or consent of the
vendor-mortgagee. The converse situation would clearly call for
the result reached by the Colorado courts. The weight of authority
is to the effect that, if the removal of the property to the second
state was contemplated at the time of the contract, the vendor's
title will not be protected as against persons who purchase the property in the second state in good faith from the vendee, or as against
creditors of the vendee who levy thereon, after such removal, unless filed or recorded in the second state as provided by local law. 26
On the other hand, if the removal was not so contemplated, and if
removal was without the knowledge or consent of the vendor, the
courts in virtually all states, the notable exceptiotis being Texas, 27
Illinois, 28 and Colorado, afford protection to the vendor's title without the necessity of recording in the second state. The undesirable
results of a contrary doctrine are clearly seen in the following
passage by Professor Beale, referring to the Texas law, which is
similar to that of Colorado :29
It appears to be a regular course of business for a swindler
to buy a motor car on credit in California or elsewhere, drive it
into Texas, and sell or pledge it there. The original seller is.helpless in the face of this practice; and Texas will doubtless continue
full of willing bona fide buyers. That this result is most unfortunate from the point of view of commercial practice is clear.
See collection of cases in 25 A.L.R. 1153 at 1158 (1923).
27Consolidated Garage Co. v. Chambers, 111 Tex. 293, 231 S.W. 1072 (1921)
"Judy v. Evans, 109 Ill. App. 155 (1903).
"Beale, Jurisdiction Over Title of Absent Owner, 40 HARV. LAW REv. 805, 810
(1927).
26
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The right of Colorado to maintain a public policy against the
use of conditional sales contracts in purely local transactions is not
open to question. There are other states having a similar local
policy; however, even in those states, the position is generally taken
that, notwithstanding the local rule on conditional sales, where the
contract is entered into in another state in which it is valid and
has the effect of reserving title, it may be enforced in the forum,
and such reserved rights will
30 be superior to those of a subsequent
purchaser from the vendee.
When there is an attempt to apply this doctrine not only to
local transactions, but also to the valid transactions in other states,
entirely different considerations are present. Mere dissimilarities
in the law of the forum and that of State X do not alone justify the
refusal to enforce a valid foreign right. In the words of Justice
Cardozo, s '
The courts are not free to refuse to enforce a foreign right at

the pleasure of the judges, to suit the individual notion of expediency or fairness. They do not close their doors unless help would
violate some fundamental principle of justice, some prevalent conception of good morals, some deep-rooted tradition of the common
weal."

This sense of obligation was expressed by a Colorado court in
Harper v. People, supra as follows: "The contract will not be
deemed to be opposed to the policy of this state unless based on
immoral or criminal considerations."
Is it a violation of a fundamental principle of justice to recognize the title of a conditional vendor when that title is valid by
the law of the only jurisdiction in which he has knowingly permitted the property to be present? Is there any immoral or criminal
consideration involved in such recognition? If the Colorado courts
would relent in the future with respect to conditional sale contracts that were recorded in a sister state, should they not also
recognize the title of conditional vendors acquired in other states
wherein the law did not require recordation of such interests?
Would it be a violation of the deep-rooted tradition of our commonweal to recognize the title of a conditional vendor from State
X (where the law does not require recordation) if our courts had
determined to recognize the title of a conditional vendor from
State Y (where the law requires recordation) ? Or is recordation
in a foreign state only of dubious value in protecting Colorado
citizens ?
It is not to be inferred that a state such as Colorado should
disregard the welfare of its citizens who deal with non-residents.
It is submitted, however, that any attempted distinction between
out-of-state chattel mortgages and out-of-state conditional sales
" Security Sales Co. v. Blackwell, 9 La. App. 651, 120 So. 250 (1928) ; Fry Bros.
v. Theobold, 205 Ky. 146, 265 S.W.489 (1924); Barrett v. Kelley, 66 Vt. 515, 29 Atl.
809 (1894).
'2Loucks v. Standard Oil Co., 224 N.Y. 99, 120 N.E. 198 (1918).
2 Emphasis added.
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contracts, when both are recorded in the other state, relates only to
minor morals of expediency and debatable questions of internal
policy. It is further submitted that recordation in a distant state,
where the transaction is valid by both the lex loci contractus and
the law of the situs of the property, is of doubtful value in protecting Colorado citizens.
One method by which states have afforded a measure of protection to their citizens is exemplified by section 14 of the Uniform
Conditional Sales Act by which the reservation of title in the vendor
is void as to certain purchasers and creditors, when the property
is removed into another state, unless the vendor, within ten days
after he has received notice of the removal, records the contract
in the state to which the goods have been removed. This principle
could be extended so as to apply to chattel mortgages. A second
type of protection is found in statutes which give certain classes
of lien holders, i.e. repairmen, priority over the title of the conditional vendor. Doubtless there are numerous other measures
which a state may adopt for the protection of its citizens, and yet
be consistent with a sense of fairness to citizens of other states.
But to refuse recognition to rights arising out of certain types of
transactions in other states merely because we would prefer the
use of other types of transactions is to evidence a provincialism
which has no place in our modern commercial life.

Exit Horatio (Laughing)
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SUPPLEMENTARY PROCEEDINGS IN
ENFORCEMENT OF JUDGMENTS*
WILLIAM RANN NEWCOMB
of the Denver Bar

A layman might suggest as a subtitle for this article, "Back
'em up to the wall" or "How to pick their pockets legally." The
source of the legality of such conduct is to be found in Rule 69 of
the Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure. It is important at the outset to explain this rule briefly together with its history. The rule
is divided into eight parts, subparagraphs "A" through "H". Those
parts are as follows:
A. Process to enforce a money judgment shall be a writ of
execution, unless the court directs otherwise.
B. Execution for costs may issue in like manner, as upon a
judgment.
C. Any person who is a judgment debtor after issuance of an
execution against property, may pay the sheriff the amount of the
debt and such payment will discharge the judgment.
D. Whenever execution may issue on a judgment, the judgment creditor shall be entitled to an order for the debtor to appear
before the court, or a master, at a specified time and place to answer
concerning his property. If a debtor resides outside the country,
the court may make just orders as to mileage and expenses. If it
appears to the court that there is danger of the debtor absconding
it may issue an order of arrest, bring him before the court, and
require a bond conditioned on his appearing at the time of the hearing and upon disposing of any of his property. If he does not post
such a bond, he may be committed to jail.
E. A debtor of the judgment debtor may be required to
appear and be questioned.
F. The court, or master, may order any property of the judgment debtor not exempt from execution in the hands of such debtor
or any other person, or due to the judgment debtor, to be applied
towards the satisfaction of the judgment. Violation of this order
is punishable by contempt. Nothing in the rule shall be construed to
prevent an action in the nature of a creditor's bill.
G. Witnesses may be required to appear and testify as at any
trial.
H. Depositions may be taken in the same manner of any
person upon order of court obtained ex parte.
The above rule is copied, to a great extent, from the former
Code of Civil Procedure. Only two significant changes were made
* This is in substance the discussion given by Mr. Newcomb at the first session of
the Denver Bar Association's institute on creditors' rights, January 24, 1950.
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in the rule: First, it no longer provides that execution must issue
and be returned nulla bona as a prerequisite to supplementary proceedings, and, secondly, the motion seeking such an order need not
be verified. It should also be noted that in turn the Code is "almost
a literal transcript of the provisions of the Code of California on
the same subjeot, and are similar to the provisions of the codes of
Wisconsin and New York."1
PURPOSE OF RULE

69

There are, it is believed, three fundamental objectives in the
use of Rule 69. Behind all of them, however, there lurks the haunting suspicion of counsel that the debtor has some property somewhere that could be applied to the judgment. If the defendant is
obviously judgment-proof, it is useless to invoke the rule. If it is
suspected he is not judgment-proof, a creditor's lawyer has three
things in mind in the use of Rule 69:
(1)
Discover his assets.
(2)
Have those assets applied on the judgment in a summary
fashion at the time of the hearing.
(3)
Discover facts concerning the debtor's past and present
financial condition and transactions as a basis for additional proceedings, such as a creditor's bill, or involuntary bankruptcy to recover a preference.
In view of these purposes, it is clear that counsel, before embarking upon the use of Rule 69, should have at least a general
understanding of the substantive law in the whole field of creditors'
rights. If he doesn't, he is not apt to ask the right questions to get
at the important facts. For example, if the debtor is a corporation,
counsel would want to know if there are any stockholders who have
not paid for their stock. He must know the Bulk Sales Act, the
laws on fraudulent conveyances, the various acts of bankruptcy,
and voidable preferences. It has been said that there are two rules
to follow: (1) Always follow-through on questioning to get the
complete story. (2) Make sure questions are founded upon the applicable substantive law.
It would he fruitless for anyone to attempt to discuss in detail
the exact questions which should be submitted to the debtor or to
the debtor's debtor. Suffice it to say that one may find an excellent
beginning point in the pamphlet of the Practicing Law Institute,
entitled, "Collecting Claims."
METHOD OF INVOKING RULE
Two papers have to be prepared by the lawyer invoking Rule
69 with regard to summoning the judgment debtor-the motion
and order. The motion need allege only two things, to-wit: Judgment has been entered and that execution may issue. The order,
'IHexter v. Clifford, 5 Colo. 168 (1879).
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which must be prepared by counsel in advance, should contain the
time and place for the appearance of the debtor. This order may
be directed to the clerk to issue a citation, which may then be served
by the sheriff on the debtor, or the order could be prepared in duplicate and provide in itself that a copy of the order may be served
upon the debtor in the same manner as a summons under Rule 4.
It is advisable in preparing the order to leave the time for the hearing blank so that the judge and his clerk may fill it in when it is
presented. This proceeding, of course, is ex parte.
ORDERS FOR PROPERTY TO BE APPLIED

In order to discuss this phase of the problem it is necessary
to indulge in several assumptions, namely: the judgment debtor has
been brought into court and questioned exhaustively as to his property; "his pocket has been picked" of any cash that he might have
had on his person and the court has ordered it paid into the registry
of the court to be applied on the judgment; and similar orders have
been procured with respect to any jewelry or other thing of value
he may have had on his person not exempt from execution, such as
wearing apparel. It further may be assumed that questioning has
developed certain fact situations:
(a) that the debtor has cash in his control.
(b) that the debtor has other intangible personal property.
(c)
that the debtor has real estate.
(d) that he has property located outside the state.
(e)
that he has money owing him by his debtors.
(a) Cash in Control of Debtor
Where it is learned that the debtor has cash either in a bank
account or in some place where he has access to it, is it necessary
to adjourn the hearing, deliver a writ of execution to the sheriff,
and attempt to race the debtor to the location of the cash? It is
not. The authorities are clear that the court may then and there
order the debtor to go get the money and either pay it to counsel,
to the sheriff, or to the clerk of the court. Conceivably, it may even
be possible for the court to order the defendant to make out a
check drawn on any bank account which he has admitted he has.
Some of the cases dealing with these fascinating possibilities are,
as follows:
Hosmer v. Mutual Reserve Ins. Co. 2 In this case the court

ordered that the defendant insurance company pay over $250.00
from its surplus to the plaintiff after a full hearing had been had
into the financial condition of the company. Incidentally, it was
argued in this case that since the company was a mutual fire insurance company, the other members had an equal right to the surplus,
but the court said: "Diligence justifies a preference."
2145 Kan. 381, 65 P. 2d 295 (1937).
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Medical Finance Ass'n v. Short.3 Upon examination the defendant disclosed that she had in her possession and under her
control a check in her favor in the sum of $47.50 as services rendered to a governmental agency, the Works Progress Administration. The lower court refused to order that she apply any portion
of this check to the judgment. The appellate department, however,
reversed, and said:
Although the intangible credit could not be reached by plaintiff in such a proceeding as this while it remained a mere debt due
from the government to defendant, it became available and amenable to control of the court when its status and character were
changed to the extent of its becoming tangible property in the
actual possession and control of defendant, i.e., when she received
the check. If necessary or expedient in securing the conversion of
the check into legal tender and the application of one-half thereof
toward saisfaction of the judgment, the court may appoint a receiver for that purpose.

Wilson v. Columbia Casualty Co. 4 In this case it appeared that
shortly after the judgment had been entered, the defendant, who
was in Ohio, sent $1250-00 to his brother in Washington, Pennsylvania. It was admitted that the brother held this fund in trust for
the defendant. The court, in a supplementary proceeding, found
as follows:
Said Addison R. Wilson (the defendant) owns and has the
absolute control and disposition of the sum of $1250.00 which he
wrongfully and fraudulently has sent out of the State of Ohio with
intent to prevent the same being applied on the judgment in the
foregoing action, and should be applied on said judgment, and said
application is therefore granted.

The court thereupon
sum to the sheriff to
refused to do so and
court. The Supreme
following language:

ordered the defendant to pay over the said
be applied on the judgment. The defendant
appealed from his sentence for contempt of
Court of Ohio affirmed the sentence, in the

Plaintiff in error urges that, since the money sought to be
reached was not in the physical possession of Addison R. Wilson,
the court was without jurisdiction to make any order respecting
the fund. This contention, however, is incorrect. The court of
common pleas could not make an order upon the brother in Washington, Pa., to pay the money upon the judgment, nor could it
attach or sequester the fund in Washington, Pa., but it could and
did order the defendant in Cleveland, Ohio, to take such action
that the fund in Pennsylvania could be applied to the satisfaction
of the judgment. The jurisdiction of the court over the defendant
was undoubted.
Obviously the direction from Wilson must be sent from Cleveland to Washington, Pa. When the fund is in the possession of the
brother in Pennsylvania, the brother in Ohio cannot physically
turn it over in Ohio; but the brother in Ohio can and must set in
'36 Cal. App. 2d 745, 92 P. 2d 961 (1939).
1118 Ohio St. 319, 160 N.E. 906 (1928).
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process the train of action which will result in the same being applied upon this judgment, and that the brother in Ohio, according
to this record, has not even begun to do.

(b) Intangible Personal Property of the Debtor
With respect to intangible personal property, the immediately
preceding case is important, and in addition, there is the case of
Iowa Methodist Hospital v. Long,5 in which it was disclosed upon
examination that the defendant had under his control a number of
Series "E" Government bonds. It was determined by the lower
court that some of them had been purchased directly from the
wages of the defendant and were therefore exempt under the
statutes of Iowa, which exempt wages, but that some of them had
not been so purchased. The court held:
It is therefore ordered that the defendant sell the balance of
the fourteen bonds heretofore not declared exempt to him, and pay
the proceeds into the office of the clerk of the municipal court by
noon of the 30th day of July, 1943.

On appeal, the Supreme Court held that none of the bonds were
exempt and that the order of the lower court should have applied
to all of them.
(c) Real Estate of the Debtor
With respect to real estate, the cases are not in accord.
In Walker v. Staley,6 the Colorado court said:
Sec. 270, supra (referring to the Code) does not contemplate
that real property may be sold under order of court made in a supplementary proceeding, even when title stands in the name of the
judgment debtor. In such case the judgment creditor may cause
execution to be levied upon the property; it requires no order of
court.

In this case, however, it appeared in the supplementary proceeding that title to the property was in the defendant's wife's
name, but more of that later. It should be noted, however, that
this case was decided before the Rules of Civil Procedure were
adopted. Since, under Rule 69, this proceeding may be instituted
without an execution being returned nulla bona, the reason for
Walker v. Staley, supra, no longer seems to apply. Consequently,
if the question were argued again it is possible that the Colorado
Supreme Court would follow the majority rule as stated below.
Cleverly v. District Court,7 seems to state the majority view
of this question. In this case, on a supplementary proceeding, the
lower court found that a piece of real estate standing in the names
of the defendants was not exempt as a homestead, directed the sheriff to proceed against the property and to apply the proceeds from
the sale thereof towards satisfaction of the judgment. The Supreme
Court affirmed, in these words:
1234 Ia. 843, 12 N.W. 2d 171, 150 A.L.R. 440 (1944).
689 Colo. 292, 1 P. 2d 924 (1931).
'85 Utah 440, 39 P. 2d 748 (1939).
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Every species of property is included in the term "any property," so that the order may be made applicable to any species of
property of a judgment debtor, including real property or an interest therein.

(d) Property of Debtor Outside the State
Where the questioning reveals that the judgment debtor owns
real estate or other tangible property in another state there is a
serious problem as to how far the Colorado court can go in subjecting that property to the Colorado judgment. There is a scarcity
of cases on this point, but what decisions there are seemed to be
summed up in 21 Am. Jur. 329, as follows:
A judgment debtor who has property in a foreign state may not
be compelled by proceedings supplementary to execution to go there,
get the property, and apply it on the judgment. However, it is
sometimes regarded as a proper practice to require the judgment
debtor to make an assignment of such property to the receiver.

The theory of such cases, of course, is that the order of the
court acts in personam, and jurisdiction over the property itself is
not necessary. In the case of intangible personal property located
outside of the state, the cases cited above and particuarly Wilson v.
Columbia Casualty Company, supra, state the general rule.
(e) Debtor of the Judgment Debtor
The next problem involves the situation where inquiry of the
judgment debtor reveals that property belonging to him is in the
name or hands of another person, or that someone owes him money.
It is clear that counsel cannot then and there procure an order directed to the third party, since he is not as yet a party to the proceeding. Walker v. Staley, supra. In this case, the lower court, upon
the questioning of the defendant alone, found that title to a piece
of real estate in the name of his wife really belonged to defendant.
The court appointed a receiver of the property and directed him to
take charge of it and sell it, pay the receiver's expenses,. the court
costs and the judgment. Mrs. Walker was never a party to the proceeding. The Colorado Supreme Court reversed, in these words:
It was beyond the jurisdiction
order. The court had no power to
session of the property and sell it
Walker her day in court. That she

-of the court to make such an
order the receiver to take poswithout first according to Mrs.
never had.

The court also said that the proper remedy was a creditor's suit.
Bond v. Bulgheroni,8 held that a creditor's bill was the proper
remedy where there were adverse claimants to the property involved. Brindjonc v. Brindjonc,9 took a somewhat different approach. In this case the proceedings developed that a third party
8215 Cal. 7, 8 P. 130 (1932).
996 Mont. 489, 31 P. 2d 725 (1934).
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held funds which the defendant claimed belonged to the defendant.
The court stated that no order could be made requiring the third
party to pay over the money to the plaintiff at that time. The
proper procedure was to continue the hearing and order the third
party in to determine whether he had any claim to the property
and, if he disclaimed any interest, the appropriate order could be
made.
PENALTIES FOR DISOBEYING ORDERS UNDER RULE

69

Under Rule 69(f) the court, or master, has ample authority
to punish any party or witness for contempt for disobeying any
proper order. It has also been held in Colorado in the case of
Handler v. Gordon,10 that where the judgment debtor in the supplementary proceeding committed perjury, and it was so established in the hearing itself, the court has the right summarily to
punish him for contempt without leaving the punishment to formal
criminal processes. The theory, of course, is that perjury causes an
obstruction of justice.
The case of the lying judgment debtor, however, presents
many very serious problems. Assuming that the debtor is prepared
to perjure himself concerning his assets, he has the questioner at
a psychological disadvantage from the beginning because he is
generally smart enough to know that the examiner doesn't know
all that he knows, or he would not have been summoned into court
to answer questions. Consequently, there is some slight incentive
to lie about the matters inquired into. Here the examiner must resort to all the techniques generally known to the trial lawyer as
to how to treat the perjuring witness. There is no one satisfactory
answer to it. The author's experience in such a case has been to
wish fervently that our humane laws had not abolished the debtor's
prison.
MISCELLANEOUS POINTS TO BE CONSIDERED UNDER THE RULE

(a) Interim period between service of the order on the debtor
to appearand the hearing. Isn't there the danger that the judgment
debtor will cover up his property during that period of time? In
other words, is one entitled to a restraining order? There is no
mention made of this in the rule, and the only Colorado case is
Rule v. Gumeer." In this case, the lower court included in its order
requiring the defendant to appear an order restraining him from
transferring any of his property, real or personal. The defendant
moved to vacate the restraining order, his motion was overruled,
and he appealed. The supreme court denied the appeal without
considering the merits on the ground that the order was not appealable. The moral seems to be: get the order ex parte to be safe. The
10 111 Colo. 234, 140 P. 2d 622 (1943).
11 12 Colo. 591 (1889).
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author has been able to find no cases from other jurisdictions; it
should be pointed out, however, that the New York Code specifically provides for it.
(b)
Interim period between time of hearing and levy, or
other action contemplated, such as a creditor's bill. It is clear that
a court has inherent authority to issue such a restraining order,
in view of the authority given to the court in the first place by Rule
69 (f) to require the debtor to apply his property to satisfaction of
the judgment.
(c) Documents may be required to be produced. Rule 69 (g)
provides for the subpoena of witnesses as upon the trial of any
civil action. It would seem possible, therefore, to cause a subpoena
duces tecum, under Rule 45(b), to be directed to the defendant
along with the order requiring him to appear, and get the necessary business records, etc. An interesting question in this case
would be the right to compel the production of retained copies of
income tax returns. Leonard v. Wargon,12 held that a judgment
debtor may be questioned concerning recent Federal income tax
returns filed by him, and he may be required by order of the court to
produce copies of such returns in the debtor's possession. The
court points out, of course, that the judgment creditor may not
compel the production of the originals of any federal agency or
employee. There is a conflict on this point, however, with regard to
discovery rules in the trial of a civil action.
(d) Does the discovery of assets through Rule 69 give a
judgment creditora priority? There is a distinct possibility of this.
The question is annotated for your further consideration in 92 A. L.
R. 1430, which states:
Although the question is largely one of statutory interpretation, the prevailing view is that a judgment creditor who institutes
supplementary proceedings, at some stage of the proceedings, acquires a lien upon the property disclosed thereby.

This may be of great importance where there are other judgment
creditors after the same assets. One of the cases cited by 92 A. L. R.
is Ex parte Roddey.13 There were three judgment creditors involved here. One of them instituted supplementary proceedings
which disclosed that the debtor had certain securities of the value
of about $1000 which had been hypothecated in New York to secure
an indebtedness of about $185. The lower court issued an order
directing the sheriff to levy upon this property. Pursuant to this
order, the holder of the securities forwarded them to a bank in
South Carolina. In the meantime, all three judgment creditors had
placed their writs of execution in the hands of the sheriff. He
took the three executions, levied on the securities, and sold them.
Then the dispute arose as to whether all three of the judgment
creditors should share pro rata in the balance of the sales price
255 N. Y. Supp. 2d 626 (1945).
1"171 So. Car. 489, 172 S.E. 866 (1934).
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after the payment of the debt for which they were pledged. The
Supreme Court of South Carolina granted a priority to the judgment creditor who had instituted the supplementary proceeding,
and said:
It is patent that supplementary proceedings are equitable in
their nature and designed to aid the enforcement of rights which
cannot be enforced by the legal process of execution. That being
so, it much follow that Judge Stoll (the lower court) had authority
to direct the payment of the proceeds of the sale of the debtor's
property to the judgment creditor whose diligence had discovered
the property of the judgment debtor and brought it into court.

In Hexter v. Clifford,1 4 it was recognized that supplementary
proceedings are analogous to creditors' bills. However, the case
holds that supplementary proceedings under the Code became an
exclusive remedy and that a creditors' bill could not be maintained
in any case where supplementary proceedings would lie. The theory
back of that case has certainly been changed by Rule 69, which
says: "Nothing in this Rule shall be construed to prevent an action
in the nature of a creditor's bill." Consequently, the matter is still
very much an open question in this state but is certainly an arguable possibility.
69
There are two glaring deficiencies in Rule 69 which the author
would recommend be changed in accordance with New York procedure: First, there is the problem which is mentioned briefly above
concerning the interim period between the time of service of the
order to appear and the time of the hearing itself. In New York
there is a specific provision which allows the court on an ex parte
application to include in its order to appear a blanket restraining
order enjoining the debtor (or the debtor of the judgment debtor,
as the case may be) from making any transfer, assignment or
other disposition of his property. This restraining order may be
continued from time to time during the pendency of the hearing.
Secondly, there is the problem of the wage earner debtor in
this state. Our present practice is to run a garnishment on his
wages. This is not only likely to disappoint the creditor so far as
results are concerned, but also, in many cases, results in a loss of
job or subterfuges where it appears that the garnishment is going to become a weekly or monthly problem. Such a result benefits
no one. The New York Code, however, provides that in such a
case the court, after a full hearing, may order the debtor to pay
over to the creditor, or into court, a certain sum of money out of
each pay check. The amount to be paid is fixed by the Code as to
that amount over and above the necessary living expenses of the
debtor and his family. This is certainly a much more sensible approach to the problem and one that could well be considered in this
state.
RECOMMENDED AMENDMENTS TO RULE
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Colo. 168 (1879).
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REACHING FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES
AND EQUITABLE INTERESTS OF DEBTORS*
WORTH ALLEN
of the Denver Bar

The equitable rights and remedies of creditors which will be
dealt with in this paper relate to two different types of property
interests of the debtor: (1) property which has been fraudulently 1
conveyed by debtors, and (2) equitable interests which debtors may
have in property.
The existence of a creditor's interest in the first class is established by a section of the Colorado statutes 2 which provides that
every conveyance of real estate, goods, things in action, rents, profits, etc., made with intent to hinder, delay or defraud creditors or
other persons, as against the person hindered, delayed or defrauded,
"shall be void". The conveyances referred to in the statute are,
obviously, those made by debtors. It should be noted that the3
statute in terms applies to personal property as well as real estate.
However, while much that is said in the cases applies with equal
force to conveyances of real and personal property, this brief
article will be confined to real estate. It may be pointed out in passing that while there is no difference in principle between cases involving personal and real property, the duration of a statutory
lien on personal property is much shorter than that on real property, and the statute relating to lis pendens does not apply to personal property.
In the second class of cases in which creditors seek to realize
their claims out of equitable interests of the debtors, the statute
relating to fraudulent conveyances is not involved. To illustrate the
nature of the equitable interests involved in this class of cases, we
may suppose that a debtor buys property, furnishing the consideration himself, and to conceal the property from his creditors, he
directs the grantor to convey to the debtor's wife or some other
person. Another type of case which comes under this second class
arises when the property is conveyed by the debtor himself to the
third party at a time when he was not involved financially and
when he could not have had any fraudulent intent. At any rate, in
such a case, the valid legal title is in a third person, and the debtor
* This is an adaptation of the second paper presented at the Denver Bar Association's institute on creditors' rights, January 24, 1950.

1 The words, fraud, fraudulent, fraudulently, are used herein to refer to cases
including those

where possibly

no actual fraud was intended, but where the intent,

however well-meant, was to hinder and delay.
2 COLO. STAT. ANN., c. 71, § 17 (1935).
3 This is a modification of the English statute against fraudulent conveyances, 13
Eliz. c. 5, which, by the decision of Sir Edward Coke in Twyne's Case, 3 Coke, 80 b,
5 Eng. Rul. Cas. 2, was judicially determined to include conveyances
erty.

of personal prop-

DICTA
has only the equitable title. Such title may be based on the intent
of the parties, or the trust may be a constructive one imposed by
law.
NECESSARY PRELIMINARY STEPS

What steps are or have been necessary to reach the two classes
of property? Without an understanding of the sound ratio decidendi, lawyers are left in hopeless confusion after reading the
cases in which the courts themselves obviously have been confused.
Despite this apparent confusion in these recent cases, the results
seem to be proper.
The rule in both classes of cases has been that the general
creditor must have a judgment against the debtor before he can
secure relief against the latter in equity. While the reason for the
rule consistently has been stated to be "that resort cannot be had
to equity where there is an adequate remedy at law", underlying
the rule and stated reason therefor is the zealously guarded right
of trial by jury. It has been correctly stated that "the real basis
of the rule that a judgment at law is a condition precedent to
affirmative equitable relief on behalf of a creditor is, therefore,
that the debtor has the right to have the issue of indebtedness determined by jury." 4
The rule requiring judgment before granting negative relief,
which is the tying-up of the debtor's property before judgment has
been obtained against him, is based upon consideration for the
debtor. The courts concluded that it was better to leave the debtor
free to deal with his property, although he may put it out of reach
of his creditors before they obtain a judgment against him, than
possibly to permit some unscrupulous creditor to keep the struggling debtor from honestly attempting to meet his obligations.
The great confusion has arisen in considering what further
steps, if any, must be taken in the two classes of cases before resorting to equity. Under the original English statute against fraudulent conveyances and similar statutes of the states, property fraudulently conveyed by the debtor is subject to execution. Property to
which the debtor had only equitable title was not at common law or
under early statutes subject to execution. The theory under which
relief is granted against property subject to execution is entirely
different from the theory under which aid is extended to reach
property not subject to execution. It is obvious from the decisions
that the confusion of ideas is caused primarily by overlooking
the basis on which jurisdiction rests, and by the presumption
that the necessary steps, which are conditions precedent to relief in all instances where the creditor is attempting to obtain
property not subject to execution, are also necessary where he is
pursuing property which is subject to execution.
4 See Note, 23 L.R.A. (N.S.)
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WHERE THE PROPERTY IS SUBJECT TO EXECUTION

As to property subject to execution, the judgment creditor was
required to take steps to secure a lien upon the property fraudulently conveyed. The lien attaches to real estate in Colorado upon
the filing with the recorder of a certified transcript of the judgment
docket entry. 5 Thereupon the judgment creditor went into equity
and stated that the transfer was fraudulent and that his lien was
clouded and obstructed by the fraudulent transfer. He alleged that
his lien was to no avail under the present circumstances and asked
that the court clear-up the title, so as to enable him to enforce the
holding of the court of law and allow him to make an advantageous
sale of the property in question.
The lien was all that was required. The rule as to exhaustion
of the remedy at law had no application here. As a matter of fact,
one could not properly have made a return nulla bona, for the obvious reason that the property fraudulently conveyed could be
levied upon and sold, the fraudulent conveyance being void. But,
even when this property is levied upon and sold, we are still unable
to make an advantageous sale because no determination by a decree as to whether the conveyance was fraudulent had been made.
Relief at law being inadequate in such a situation, equity took
jurisdiction.
WHERE EQUITABLE TITLE IS IN THE DEBTOR

When relief was sought in the second class of cases, wherein
the judgment creditor sought to reach equitable title, no levy of
execution could be made until authorized by comparatively recent statutes. The creditor had no lien which he could ask equity
to clear. In this class of cases, as distinguished from the class involving property fraudulently conveyed by the debtor, the creditor
was required to exhaust his remedy at law by showing that the
debtor had no other property which might be reached by ordinary
legal remedies.6 Thus, in cases of this type, we have the requirement of a return nulla bona,such a return being merely proof that
there was no other property out of which the creditor's judgment
could be collected.
This fundamental distinction between the two classes of cases,
and the different conditions precedent for equitable relief in each
class, is set forth in the opinion of our Supreme Court in the case
of Chalupav. Preston,7 wherein the court quoted at length from the
very clear and sound opinion written by Judge Sanborn in Schofield
v. Ute Coal & Coke Co.,8 a case appealed from the United States
Circuit Court for the District of Colorado.
In our Colorado statutes we find the provision that from the
time of filing the transcript, the judgment becomes a lien upon "all
'COLO.

STAT. ANN.,

c. 93, § 2 (1935).

'Emery v. Yount, 7 Colo. 107, 1 P. 686 (1883).
,65 Colo. 400, 177 P. 965 (1918).
'92 F. 269 (1899).
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the real property of such judgment debtor-". 9 Nothing is said as
to whether the interest to which the lien attaches may be an equitable one, although a subsequent section of this same chapter provides for levy upon every interest in land, legal and equitable. 10
It has been held by our Supreme Court,1 ' that a judgment, upon the
filing of the transcript, becomes a lien upon an equitable interest in
land. It would seem, therefore, that from the time the two statutory
provisions just referred to became effective, the second class of
cases involving the reaching of equitable interests in land became
subject to the same rules as the first class of cases in which the
legal title remained in the judgment debtor in spite of his fraudulent conveyance. As a result of this, the supreme court held that
no return nulla bona is required as a condition precedent to reaching the equitable interests of the judgment debtor in real estate,
after the judgment creditor has secured a lien by filing the transcript. In holding this to be the law, our Colorado courts have stated
that the levy of an execution upon a lien could not make it more
specific or more efficient. The learned justices seemed to feel that
the conclusion is irresistible that the general lien upon the real
estate created by entering a judgment or filing a transcript of it
in the county where the lands of the debtor are situated, in accordance with the statutes which provide therefor, is a sufficient basis
for the maintenance of a suit in equity to2 remove a fraudulent
obstruction to the enforcement of that lien.'
Space will not permit the consideration of many other questions involved in a creditor's suit or in a suit in the nature of creditor's suit.' 3 They cause no particular difficulty. I might point out
that in exceptional cases it has been held unnecessary to procure a
judgment against the debtor before seeking equitable relief. For instance, it was held that when the judgment debtor is a non-resident,
a money judgment is not essential and that a lien4 might be obtained
by a creditor's suit with a notice of lis pendens.'
In passing, it may be pointed out that even though a debtor
conveys property to a creditor with intent to defraud or to hinder
and delay one or more other creditors, the conveyance is good if
the grantee did not participate in the known intent of the grantor,
but took the conveyance solely to secure payment of his own claim.
Knowledge on the part of the creditor receiving the property that
the debtor has acted with fraudulent intention is immaterial if the
creditor has not done anything except receive payment of his claim.
It is obvious that a creditor of an insolvent debtor must stop at
securing his debt. If he goes further than this and actively participates or assists in any way in the carrying out of the fraudulent
9COIO. STAT. ANN.,

C. 93,

§ 2 (1935).

Id., § 6.
Stephens v. Parvn, 33 Colo. 60, 78 P. 688 (1904).
Stephens v. Paxvin, 33 Colo. 60, 78 Pac. 688 (1904).
13 We need not dwell on the fact that a creditor's suit is one in which equitable
title is sought to be reached, and that a suit for relief with respect to property fraudulently
1 4 conveyed is one in the nature of a creditor's suit.
Shuck v. Quackenbush, 75 Colo. 592, 227 P. 1041 (1924).
1
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purpose, his preference so obtained will be avoided in favor of other
creditors. The motives which may have influenced the debtor to
prefer one creditor over the others are of no importance if the
preferred creditor has done nothing improper to secure the transfer.
THE EFFECT OF RULE

18 (b)

The consideration shown by the courts for those alleged to be
debtors, by leaving their property free from any lien or cloud until
a money judgment had been obtained, was abandoned by the adoption of Rule 18 (b) of our Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides:
(b)
Joinder of Remedies; Fraudulent Conveyances. Whenever
a claim is one heretofore cognizable only after another claim has
been prosecuted to a conclusion, the two claims may be joined in a
single action; but the court shall grant relief in that action only in
accordance with the relative substantive rights of the parties. In
particular, a plaintiff may state a claim for money and a claim to
have set aside a conveyance fraudulent as to him, without first
having obtained a judgment establishing the claim for money.

The result is that now the creditor may bring. suit to recover
a judgment and, in the same action, secure a decree declaring a conveyance void as being fraudulent. By filing a notice of lis pendens,
the debtor's property is held for an appropriate equitable decree
with respect thereto, if a money judgment is obtained and the conveyance is held to be fraudulent.
No case has been found under said rule, or under the identical
Federal Rule 18 (b), in which a creditor has sought a money judgment and a decree respecting the debtor's equitable title in real
estate. However, the first sentence of the rule obviously is broad
enough to include such a case. The second sentence of the rule in
referring to a fraudulent conveyance "in particular" must be regarded as providing an illustration or as saying that the general
in the first sentence includes the case set forth in the
rule found
15
second.
In a Federal case, 16 the modus operandi in the trial of a case
brought under said rule was stated as follows:
...I rule that all issues which are common to the legal causes
of action (in either count) and to the equitable cause stated in the
second count shall be tried together, the legal issues, of course, to
the jury and the equitable issues to the court; and that all equitable
issues which do not pertain to the legal causes shall be tried to the
court immediately following the jury trial.
This ruling will have practical application as follows: On the
day of trial . . . the parties will proceed precisely as though trying
to the jury both the first count and the second count viewed as
charging actionable fraud, and the rulings on the evidence will be
made as though no other issues were before the court. The court,
however, will accept all evidence which is feceived in the jury trial
for any proper bearing it may have upon the second count viewed
1Greeley
10 Ford v.

Transportation Co. v. The People, 79 Colo. 307, 245 P. 720 (1926).
C. E. Wilson Co., Inc., 30 F. Supp. 163, 165-66 (1939).
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as a cause of action in equity. After the jury has been charged and
has retired to deliberate, the court will proceed to hear additional
evidence on the equitable cause stated in the second count. There
will be neither need nor permission to reiterate evidence already
received in the jury trial; but any evidence theretofore offered and
excluded in the jury trial may again be offered for its bearing on
the second count viewed as a cause of action in equity.

Thus it is apparent that many of the old problems arising from
questions pertaining to equitable rights and the remedies of creditors have been greatly simplified by the adoption of Rule 18 (b).

Book Notices
LABOR RELATIONS LAW, by Marcus Manoff of the Massachusetts and Pennsylvania Bars. 1950. $2.00. 140 pages.
A series of basic texts on important subjects of the law is
being published by the Committee on Continuing Legal Education
of the American Law Institute collaborating with the American
Bar Association. This pamphlet is another in that series.
There has long been a need to the average general practitioner, not particularly skilled in the subject, for a basic text on
the subject of labor relations law. Most general practitioners who
represent business clients have need for at least some knowledge
of this important subject. With such knowledge, they can solve
many of the problems confronting them without the necessity of
turning them over to a specialist. Also, with such a basic knowledge they can gradually undertake the responsibility of the more
complicated labor problems of their clients. This book fills that
need. It covers the substantive aspects of labor law and combines
with this insights into practical problems. It is a general orientation booklet and a guide to substantive and procedural matters
constantly confronting the business client.
PRICE DISCRIMINATION AND RELATED PROBLEMS UNDER THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT, by Cyrus Austin of
the New York Bar. 1950. $2.00. 163 pages.
The Robinson-Patman Act is of prime importance to every
businessman whose business crosses state lines. Therefore, every
lawyer representing such clients should know something about
the act. Unfortunately, few do. This is no mere handbook. It is
a concise but comprehensive treatise, covering in one compact
volume all of the subsections of the act. Each is analyzed in turn
and all important questions of construction and compliance which
have arisen and which are apt to arise are treated. The RobinsonPatman Act is not of importance alone to lawyers who must advise
clients engaged in selling goods as to how to cqnform their pricing
practices to the act's requirements. This book will be found valuable for reference in determining the rights and responsibilities
of buyers as well.
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EXECUTIONS AND LEVIES ON TANGIBLE
PROPERTY*
GRAHAM SUSMAN
of the Denver Bar

The subject of "Judgment and Executions" covers nearly an
entire volume in Corpus Juris, so that it is apparent that only the
highlights of the Colorado law on this subject can be covered in
an article of this length. The statutory law may be found in Chapter 93 of the Colorado Statutes Annotated (1935), and reference
hereinafter made to specific sections are intended to refer to that.
chapter.
Section 2 provides that a transcript of judgment may be recorded in any county, and from the time of filing becomes a lien on
the real property of such judgment debtor located in that county,
not exempt from execution, then owned or which may thereafter
be acquired, until the lien expires. The general lien created by the
recording of the transcript is good for a period of six years from
the entry of the judgment as distinguished from the date of recording. A. transcript may be issued and recorded immediately
after the judgment is entered, even before the filing of a motion for
new trial. There is no necessity to wait for ten days, as in the case
of an execution, and for that reason it is advisable to obtain the
transcript and to record it as quickly as possible after the judgment is entered. There is no limit as to the number of transcripts
that may be issued on the same judgment.
An execution may be issued on a judgment of record at any
time within twenty years (within six years in the justice court),
and not afterwards, unless the judgment is revived as provided by
law. Section 11 provides' that the execution may be issued to any
county, so that it is possible to obtain an execution for each county
in the state at the same time, but only one execution will be issued
for any one county at any one time. If it is necessary to obtain another execution to the same county, the previous outstanding execution must be returned, together with the sheriff's return thereon.
Section 12 provides that when an execution has been issued,
it shall be delivered to the sheriff, who must then endorse thereon
the exact date, year and hour that it is received. This information
is also entered in a book which he maintains for that purpose, and
this record is open to the public. The effect of this entry by the
sheriff is to make the execution a lien upon the personal property
of the debtor from the date of such entry.' The sheriff must then
make his return on the execution within. 90 days "unless a sale is
pending under a levy made."
* This article highlights the third part of the Denver Bar Association's institute on
creditors' rights and was presented by Mr. Susman at the meeting on January 31, 1950.
I Joslin v. Spangler, 13 Colo. 491. 22 P. 804 (1889).
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LEVIES ON REAL ESTATE

Section 40 provides that when an execution is issued from any
district or county court, and a levy is made upon real estate, it is
the duty of the sheriff to file a certificate of such fact with the recorder of the county where such real estate is situated. From and
after filing the same, such levy takes effect as to creditors and bona
fide purchasers without notice, and not before. The lien created by
the recording of the levy is a specific lien upon the-property therein
described for a period of six years from the date of filing of the
certificate. The attorney should make certain that the correct legal
description of the property is contained in the certificate. It might
be well here to point out that the general lien of the transcript is
good for six years from the date of the judgment, but the specific
lien of the levy is good for six years from the date of the filing of
the certificate. This distinction should be kept in mind.
In order to prodeed with the sheriff's sale, it is necessary that
the sheriff then serve a "Notice of Levy" upon the judgment debtor,
as required by Section 31. This notice must be served in the same
manner as service of summons. If the debtor is not available for
service, then the notice must be published in the county for ten days,
and the clerk must mail a copy of the notice of levy to his last
known address, postage prepaid, and make and file an affidavit of
such mailing.
Within ten days after the service of the notice of levy, the
defendant may file his written claim for exemption with the clerk
of the court setting forth a description of the property levied upon
and the grounds of such claim of exemption. 2 If the defendant fails
to file his written claim for exemption within the ten days after
date of service, he waives his claim for exemption, and thereafter
he has no claim for damages against the officer making the levy or
against the plaintiff for levying on such exempt property. This
applies to personal property as well as real estate. On the other
hand, if the defendant files a written claim of exemption within the
ten days, then all further proceedings in connection with the levy,
sale, etc., are stayed until the matter of the claim of exemption can
be heard.
The court must immediately set the claim of exemption for
hearing at a time not less than five nor more than fifteen days from
the date of filing. If the district judge is not available to hear the
claim of exemption, or if he is disqualified or otherwise unable to
act, the county judge shall hear and determine the claim, and his
findings shall have the same force and effect as those of a district
court judge. If the court finds the property to be exempt, it will
enter an order to release the property, otherwise it will enter an
order that the property be sold. The order on the question of
whether or not the property is exempt, having been entered by the

2

For general exemption, see COLO. STAT. ANN., c. 93, §§ 13 to 22 (1935).
stead exemptions, see COLO. STAT. ANN., C. 93, § 23.to 29 (1935).

For home-
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court, it is a final judgment for the purpose of appeal or writ of
error.
Assuming the property is held to be not exempt, the sheriff
must then advertise the sale for at least twenty days in some daily
or weekly newspaper in the county. If there is no newspaper in
the county, then notice is given by a posting in "three of the most
public places" in the county. The notice must contain a description
of the property to be sold and a designation of the time and place
of sale. The sale must be a public rather than a private sale, and
it is usually held at the front entrance of the court house. It must
be held between the hours of 9:00 o'clock in the morning "and the
setting of the sun, the same day." There seems to be no statutory
requirement providing for notice of sale to be given to the defendant other than the advertising for the twenty day period. However, many attorneys usually send a copy of the advertisement to
the defendant by registered mail.
If the sheriff sells the property without advertising it, or otherwise giving notice as required by statute, "the sheriff or other officer so offending shall, for every offense, forfeit and pay the sum
of $50.00, to be recovered, with costs of suit, in any court of record
in this state by the person whose lands may be advertised and
sold." 3
As soon as the sale is completed, the sheriff then issues a certificate of purchase which contains a description of the property,
the price bid, and the time within which the purchaser is entitled
to a deed. He must also record a duplicate copy of such certificate
with the recorder within ten days from the date of sale.
THE REDEMPTION FROM SALE OF THE PROPERTY

From this point, the procedure concerning redemption by the
defendant or subsequent lienors is practically the same as redemption from sale under a trust deed by the public trustee. Upon the
expiration of the period of redemption, if the property has not been
redeemed, the sheriff must execute and deliver a deed to the then
holder of the certificate of purchase. Such deed vests a title free
and clear of all liens recorded subsequent to the recording of the
lien on which the sale was based. This deed should then be recorded.
Questions have sometimes arisen regarding the payment of
taxes, interest on prior encumbrances, water, insurance, etc. during the period of redemption. By Section 53 the holder of the certificate of purchase may pay any general or special taxes, water
assessments, premiums on insurance covering the property, or interest or principal due on a prior encumbrance, and upon presentation to the sheriff of receipts for such payments, they become an
additional claim in favor of the holder of the certificate of purchase. Before the redemption can be made, the debtor must pay
I See

COLO. STAT. ANN.,

C.

93, § 47 (1935).
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these additional amounts, together with lawful interest, in order to
obtain a certificate of redemption.
Quite often an attorney will cause a levy to be made, have the
defendant served with a notice of levy, and thereafter hold up the
actual sale for one reason or another, usually to give the defendant
an opportunity to make payment of the judgment. In the meantime, the creditor has a specific lien on the real estate, which is
good for six years from the date of levy, and he is not particularly
worried about the defendant disposing of the property. If he permits the ninety days under the execution to lapse before deciding
to proceed with the sale, he cannot do so under the execution on
which the levy was based because such execution has expired. It
would serve no useful purpose to obtain a new execution because
the levy was made under a previous one. The proper procedure,
under such circumstances, is for the creditor to file a petition
in court setting forth the facts of the execution, the levy, a description of the property levied upon, and the fact that the execution
upon which the levy was made has now expired, and request the
court for an order to sell. The court will then issue an order directed to the sheriff to proceed with the sale, and it then continues
in the same manner as though the execution had not expired. This
is the same procedure as the old common law writ of venditioni
exponas.4
LEVIES ON PERSONAL PROPERTY
Much of the material contained in the foregoing discussion
relative to the sale of real estate is equally applicable to the sale of
personal property. It has already been pointed out that the entry
of the execution in the sheriff's book constitutes a lien on the personal property of the debtor, although there cannot be a sale of
such property until there has been an actual seizure and it is in the
possession of the sheriff. The procedure for service of notice of
levy is exactly the same whether it be real or personal property.
The sale of personal property must be advertised by the sheriff
for a period of ten days, instead of twenty days as in the case of
real estate, and the public sale then proceeds in the same manner.
The only difference is the fact that there is no redemption period
when personal property is sold. The buyer obtains a sheriff's bill
of sale, and upon payment of the bid, the personal property is delivered to the buyer.
Generally speaking, any specie of personal property described
as a chattel is subject to execution, provided that it is not exempt
by statute, and provided that it is in being at the time of the levy
and sale. 5 Under Section 8, the sheriff may levy upon "all current
gold and silver coins, bank bills and other evidences of debt, used
'66 C. J. 430.
'28 C. J. 325.
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or circulated ... as money." Under this statute, the sheriff may
levy upon the money in a cash register or strong box.
In the event that the value of the property seized is greater
than the statutory exemption, the court may order the property
sold, and out of the first proceeds of such sale, order that the defendant shall be paid the amount of his exemption. For example,
tools in trade are exempt up to $200. If a creditor should attach
a printing machine and sell it for $500, he must pay the first $200
to the defendant and apply the balance to the reduction of the
judgment. On the other hand, if the property seized consists of
a number of items and can be divided, the value of each item may
be fixed by an appraiser appointed by the court, and the defendant
may then choose such items as he pleases, not to exceed the amount
of his exemption. The balance may then be sold to apply on the
judgment.
REVIVAL OF JUDGMENTS

It has heretofore been pointed out that a transcript is only
good as a general lien for a period of six years from the date of
judgment, although an execution may be issued at any time within
twenty years from the date of judgment in a court of record. This
raises the practical problem of how to keep a transcript alive after
the judgment is six years old. This can be accomplished by means
of reviving the judgment.
Rule 54 C (h) sets forth the manner in which a judgment may
be revived. A motion should be filed setting forth the date of the
judgment and the amount remaining unsatisfied. The clerk then
issues a notice directed to the defendant to show cause within ten
days why the judgment should not be revived. This notice must be
served upon the defendant in the same manner as a summons.
If the defendant answers, a trial may be held on the issue presented by the answer. If no answer is filed, a revived judgment is
entered after the expiration of the ten day period. A new transcript
should then be obtained and recorded.
The rules provide that if a judgment is revived before the expiration of a lien created by the original judgment, the filing of a
transcript of "entry of revivor" with the clerk and recorded before
the expiration of the lien continues that lien for the same period
from the entry of the revived judgment as is provided for original
judgments. A revived judgment may be again revived in a court of
record but not in the justice court.
The important thing to keep in mind in connection with this
subject is that the revived judgment must be entered within twenty
years after the entry of judgment which it revives, six years in the
justice court.6 In other words, one cannot wait until five days before the expiration of the twenty year period, because a ten day
'COLO.

STAT. ANN., C. 96 § 44 (1)

and 44(2)

(Supp. 1949).
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notice is necessary, and time for service must be allowed. In such
event the judgment of revival could not possibly be entered before
the original judgment expired. Sufficient time must, therefore, be
allowed for this purpose.
STATUS OF JUDGMENT CREDITOR IN COLORADO

One of the important phases of this subject and one upon which
there is a decided difference of opinion, is the question of the status
of the judgment creditor in Colorado. As will be presently indicated, even the decisions of the Colorado Supreme Court on this
subject cannot be reconciled. In the case of Zuckermcn v. Gunther,7 our court made the unqualified statement that, "The law in
this state is to the effect that a judgment creditor is in the same
position as a bona fide purchaser for value."
It appears that Zuckerman had two cars that he desired to
sell. He took them to a used car lot in Denver on Broadway where
there was displayed a sign reading, "Consignment Lot". He left
the cars there to be sold. The sheriff then seized the cars under an
execution which he held against the owner of the car lot, and Zuckerman brought replevin against the sheriff. There had been no
transfer of titles to the used car dealer. The court held that the
execution creditor was entitled to the cars, and Zuckerman, although an innocent party to the transaction, lost his cars. The
opinion further states that the court was "not impressed with the
attempted distinction that the seizure of the cars was not in the
usual course of trade in view of the legal status of the defendant as
a bona fide purchaser for value. Under our law, one connotes the
other. The record presents purely a question of estoppel."
It might be conceded that if a bona fide purchaser for value
bought the cars in the usual course of trade, such purchaser would
have a good title, but here, because of the theory of estoppel and
the legal status of an execution creditor as a bona fide purchaser,
the judgment creditor obtain a better title than the debtor himself,
who had no title at all.
The Supreme Court has never overruled the Zuckerman case
but it has refused to follow it in subsequent decisions. In Wilson v.
Mosko,8 both plaintiff and defendant were used car dealers. Wilson
delivered a car to one Kelly, also a dealer, for the purpose of demonstration and sale. Kelly sold the car to Mosko and obtained payment therefor. Later, on a pretext, Kelly obtained possession of
the car and returned it to Wilson's garage. Mosko learned that the
car was there, retook possession, whereupon Wilson brought a replevin action against Mosko.
Here was a situation in which Wilson had placed the car in the
possession of a dealer for purpose of resale, just as Zuckerman did
1105
Colo. 176, 96 P. 2d 4 (1939).
8110 Colo. 127, 130 P. 2d 927 (1942).
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in leaving his cars at the consignment lot. If an attaching creditor
of Kelly had seized the car while in Kelly's possession under an
execution, then, presumably, the factual situation would be the
same as in the Zuckerman case, and the execution creditor would
have obtained a good title as against the real owner. Mosko was
more than an execution creditor, he was a bona fide purchaser for
value. But the court refused to follow the Zuckerman case and held
in favor of Wilson. The court distinguished that case by saying
that here there was no showing of an actual authority in Kelly to
sell and transfer title to the car. The extent of his authority was
to find a purchaser.
This case was immediately followed by Gunthner v. Union
FinanceCo.9 There the loan company had a floor-plan chattel mortgage on a car owned by the used car dealer. Such a mortgage provides that the car is not to be sold for less than the amount of the
encumbrance and that, upon sale, the proceeds are to be delivered
to the finance company. A judgment creditor of the used car dealer
seized the car under execution. The creditor claimed that it took
the car free from the lien of the chattel mortgage.
The car was a part of the stock in trade, having been on the
used car lot when taken. If a clear title could have been acquired
by a bona fide purchaser for value, under the authority of the
Zuckerman case the attaching creditor would also take it free from
the chattel mortgage. The creditor relied entirely upon the Zuckerman case, but again the court refused to follow its previous decision. The only basis for distinction is pointed out by the court in
this statement: "We think the Zuckerman case has no application
as is indicated by one statement therefrom, viz: the record presents
purely a question of estoppel."
In the opinion of the writer, this purported distinction has no
basis in fact. The legal question involved in the two cases are identical, and the court could have clarified the law if it had come out
openly and said that it had probably made a mistake in the Zuckerman case and that it was expressly overruled.
THE LATEST COLORADO CASE RETURNS TO THE GENERAL RULE

Many lawyers who handle this type of litigation were curious
to know what the court would decide in a case involving a judgment creditor and where the element of estoppel was also present.
Such a case was recently decided in Susman v. Exchange National
Bank.10 In that case the plaintiff had a judgment against one Taylor for about $2,000. Learning that he had a checking account in
a certain bank, plaintiff obtained execution and garnisheed the
bank. The bank answered that it had $728 on deposit in a checking
account in the name of the defendant. Thereupon a third party
110 Colo. 449, 135 P. 2d 237 (1943).
10117 Colo. 12, 183 P. 2d 571 (1947).
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filed a petition in intervention, claiming that the money belonged
to him.
The intervenor alleged that he had given Taylor $750 for the
purpose of buying some cows; that Taylor had deposited his money
to his account in his own name; and that before he had a chance to
buy the cows, the garnishment impounded the funds. At the trial,
it was established that there had been a deposit of $750 about the
time of the transaction with the intervenor, but it also appeared
that Taylor had paid amounts to a grocery store, a department
store, and a music teacher by check drawn on this account and had
thus actually used some of the $750 for these purposes.
It thus appeared that the intervenor had given the judgment
debtor ostensible ownership of the fund, and the element of estoppel
was present and was pleaded. If Taylor had bought his wife a new
dress and paid for it by check drawn on this account, could it be
successively urged that the intervenor could follow the fund and
reclaim it from the merchant? The judgment debtor had full control of the account, and there was nothing to indicate that there
had been a special deposit or that the money constituted a trust
fund. Keeping in mind the status of a judgment creditor under the
Zuckerman case, the plaintiff was in the same position as a bona
fide purchaser for value. He was in the same position as the grocer
and the department store who had accepted Taylor's checks in return for merchandise.
The court held for the intervenor saying:
The garnishing creditor can reach funds of the depositor only
in cases where the depositor is the true owner thereof . . . The
creditor of a bank depositor who garnishes the money in the bank
to the credit of his debtor is in no better position than the depositor.
Consequently, funds cannot be attached or garnished in an action
against the depositor where they have been deposited in trust or
belonging to another. We regard Zuckerman v. Guther as distinguishable.

Under this latest decision, it would appear that the court has
completely reversed itself, and instead of holding that a judgment
creditor could obtain a better title than the defendant himself had,
it now follows the doctrine that a judgment creditor acquires no
better title than is held by the defendant. If this principal had
been applied to the Zuckerman case, the results would have been
different. This view is consistent
with the general rule 11 and with
the earlier Colorado decisions. 12
But the Zuckerman case still stands on the books of this state
as the law on this subject, though not always followed. Who knows
under what circumstances the court may decide to follow it again?
It should either be expressly overruled or declared to be the law of
this state so that the uncertainty which now exists on this subject
would be removed.
11 23 C. J. 745 et seq.
12Ohio Co. v. Barr, 58 Colo. 116, 144 P. 522 (1914) ; Copeland v. Bank, 13 Colo.
App. 489, 59 P. 70 (1899) ; Irwin v. Beggs, 24 Colo. App. 158, 132 P. 385 (1913); Hartstock v. Wright, 16 Colo. App. 48, 64 P. 245 (1901).
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CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN TAXATION
BY ALBERT J. GOULD AND KENNETH L. SMITH
of the Denver Bar

PRESUMPTION OF CORRECTNESS OF COMMISSIONER'S DETERMINATION

In the FederalNational Bank of Shawnee case, decided in our
Tenth Circuit, where a taxpayer had acquired an insurance policy
some twenty years previously with other assets of an insolvent
bank, the Commissioner contended that the entire proceeds less
collection expenses were taxable under Section 22 (b) (2) (A).
The taxpayer contended, and the Court of Appeals so held, that the
Commissioner should have found either the amount of consideration or cost basis or determined that it was not ascertainable from
the taxpayer's records, and that the taxpayer was under no obligation to prove that the Commissioner's action was incorrect. Since
the Commissioner's determination was excessive, the Court of Appeals held that the taxpayer did not have to show that he owed no
tax or the correct amount of tax which he did owe. The case was
remanded to the Tax Court to find the Commissioner's determination invalid unless on a further hearing he offered evidence of the
correct amount of the tax owing.
LOANS TO CONTROLLED CORPORATIONS

Bona fide intention and business purpose doctrine gradually
has been injected into loan transactions from stockholders to controlled corporations. In Spreckles, T. C. Memo, decided Dec. 27,
1949, the court held that a loan by the stockholder to the corporation was deductible as a bad debt and the Tax Court stated that
"intention is the controlling factor and where the bona fides is not
questioned (as here) the fact that the lender was the sole stockholder and the corporation's business was not prospering are not
a basis for disregarding the true intention or the right of the parties to create debts".
In Wilshire and Western Sandwiches, 175 F. 2d 718, the Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the Tax Court, looking
primarily to the intent of the parties and found that the parties had
intended to create a debtor-creditor status between the stockholders
and the corporation.
However, in the Eighth Circuit (Wetterau Grocer Co., C.A.
8th, Jan. 17, 1950) it was decided that a corporation was paying
dividends and not interest against its socalled debenture notes.
The notes had been given to stockholders in exchange for preferred
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stock which had previously been issued as a dividend on the common
stock. The court found that there had been no money borrowed,
that the notes had characteristics of preferred stock in that the
interest depended upon earnings, that the debentures were nonnegotiable and subordinate to general creditors' claims.
In Lansing Community Hotel Corporation, 14 T.C. 24, the directors declared a 100% dividend on the par value common stock
payable in ten-year debentures, 5% cumulative interest payable
only out of surplus, and the debentures were subordinate to creditors. The Commissioner argued that the debentures did not constitute a bona fide obligation and hence the interest was not deductible. The Tax Court held for the taxpayer, with six judges
dissenting. Even though there was no borrowing of new money
the Tax Court held that it is immaterial that interest was payable
only out of income, that there was no discretion to pay or not to
pay and that the interest was unqualifiedly payable at maturity. The
dissent held there was no indebtedness because the debentures
were merely substituted for an equity interest.
REMARKS: The cases in the Courts of Appeals have looked
to the business purpose and the Lansing Community Hotel Corporation case is obviously slated for review. This line of cases should
be watched with interest and all instances of loans to closely-held
corporations should be created only where there is a bona fide intention to create an absolute indebtedness.
SALE OF PARTNERSHIP ASSETS

In Hatch, 14 T.C. 31, it was held that execution by the copartners transacting business under the firm name, of a bill of
sale for certain assets of the partnership was a sale by the partnership. Hence the gain or loss was an ordinary gain or loss, or a
capital gain or loss, depending upon the nature of the assets .sold,
and not a sale of a partnership interest.
REMARKS: A distribution of the assets to the partnership
and a sale by them may affect the tax savings.

The Book Trader's Corner
William Histed, Kittredge Bldg., Denver (AC 5801), is optimistically seeking a whole set of Pacific reporters, both first and
second series, and the Pacific digest.
Hardly a day goes by that the bar association office does not
receive a request for a set of CSA, fondly known to the readers
of our footnotes as "Colo. Stat. Ann."
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SCHEDULE OF SESSIONS
FOR

CONFERENCE ON LEGAL EDUCATION AND
ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR
April 27 to 28, 1950
University of Colorado, Boulder, Colorado
PROGRAM - ANNUAL LAW DAY
April 29, 1950

THURSDAY, APRIL 27
10:00 a.m.
10:30 a.m.

Registration-School of Law.
Opening Session-East Room, Law Library
1. Address of Welcome-W. F. Doyle, Vice President,
University of Colorado.
2.

1:30 p.m.

Address-"Preparation for the Legal Profession"
-John G. Hervey, Adviser to the Section of Legal
Education and Admissions to the Bar, American
Bar Association.

Conference, East Room, Law Library-"What should
be the minimum requirements for admission to the
bar?"-Edward C. King, Dean, School of Law, University of Colorado, presiding.
1.

Personal character and ability.
(a) Ethical standards and awareness of a lawyer's
responsibilities to society-Orie L. Phillips,
Judge, U. S. Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit.
(b) Knowledge of general principles of lawStanley H. Johnson, Denver Attorney.
(c) Knowledge of local law-Frank F. Dolan,
Boulder Attorney.
(d) Ability in professional crafts and in use of
the English language-Charles J. Beise, Denver Attorney.
(e) Student point of view - Henry Hutchinson,
Student, School of Law, University of Coloorado.
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2.

8:00 p.m.

An assured place at the bar.
Shall there be quantitative limitations as well
as qualitative requisites ?-James P. Gifford,
Associate Dean, School of Law, Columbia
University.
Conference, East Room, Law Library-"How should
the curriculum be constructed to meet the requirements of active practice, of society, and of the bar
examinations ?"-Wesley A. Sturges, Dean, School of
Law, Yale University, presiding.
1.
Pre-law educational requirements - Spencer L.
Kimball, Assistant Dean, School of Law, University of Utah.
2. Teaching legal method and analysis-Alfred L.
Gausewitz, Dean, College of Law, University of
New Mexico.
3. Sociological and non-legal courses-Gordon W.
Johnston, Dean, College of Law, University of
Denver.
4.
Teaching the crafts--Robert R. Hamilton, Dean,
School of Law, University of Wyoming.
5. Devices for teaching fact finding - Frederic P.
Storke, Professor, School of Law, University of
Colorado.
6. The place of local law-Clifford Mills, Dean, Westminster Law School.
7. Student point of view - John Wendt, Student,
School of Law, University of Colorado.

FRIDAY, APRIL 28
9:00 a.m.

Conference, East Room, Law Library-"What method
should be used to determine the applicant's educational
fitness for admission to the bar ?"--James E. Brenner,
Professor of Law, Stanford University, and Secretary
of the National Conference of Bar Examiners, presiding.
1. Certification by an accredited law school (the diploma privilege) -Dwight Campbell, former Justice, Supreme Court of South Dakota.
2. A uniform national bar examination - L. Dale
Coffman, Dean, School of Law, University of
California at Los Angeles.
3. Comprehensive examinations at the end of each
year in law school under joint sponsorship of state
bar and law school deans.-W. H. Robinson, Jr.,
Denver Attorney.

DICTA
The customary post-graduate bar examinationFred Farrar, Chairman, Colorado State Board of
Law Examiners.
5. Student point of view-Ray Johnson, Student,
School of Law, University of Colorado.
Conference, East Room, Law Library--"What examination techniques best test legal capabilities ?"-Sheldon D. Elliott, Dean, School of Law, University of
Southern California, presiding.
1. Selection of questions-Jean Breitenstein, Denver
Attorney.
2. Types of questions-Henry Weihofen, Professor,
College of Law, University of New Mexico.
3. Criteria of grading-Frank Trelease, Professor,
School of Law, University of Wyoming.
4. Testing of character and personality factors-Benjamin E. Sweet, Chairman, Bar Committee, Colorado State Board of Law Examiners.
5. Student point of' view-Anthony Williams, Student, School of Law, University of Colorado.
4.

1:30 p.m.

SATURDAY, APRIL 29
ANNUAL LAW DAY
Under joint auspices Boulder County Bar Association and
University of Colorado School of Law
9:00 a.m.

Registration-School of Law.

10:30 a.m.

Convocation-University Theater.
1. Summary of conference discussions and recommendations. Dean Edward C. King, Dean Gordon W.
Johnston, Professor James Brenner, Dean Sheldon
D. Elliott. Dean Alfred L. Gausewitz, presiding.
2. Address: "The Profession and Legal Education,"
-Wesley A. Sturges, Dean, School of Law, Yale
University.

1:00 p.m.

Luncheon-Gold Room, Memorial Building-For all
attending Law Day Activities. Tickets $1.00.
Melvin Dinner, President, Student Bar Association,
University of Colorado School of Law, presiding.
Presentation of the Dunklee Award - Edward V.
Dunklee, Denver Attorney.
Address-Bernard C. Gavit, Dean, School of Law,

DICTA

2:30 p.m.

3:00 to
5:00 p.m.
6:30 p.m.

University of Indiana, and former President of the
Association of the American Law Schools.
Recreation.
Attorney-Law Student Golf Tournament, Boulder
Country Club Golf Course.
Colorado Relays, Folsom Stadium.
Tennis and swimming facilities of University also
available.
Tea for ladies attending the conference or accompanying their husbands to Boulder-Residence of Dean and
Mrs. Edward C. King, 1001 Baseline Road.
Informal banquet honoring senior law students. Waynes Cafe, 15th and Pearl Streets, Boulder.-For
all attending Law Day Activities. Tickets $1.50.
Horace B. Holmes, President, Boulder County Bar Association, presiding.
Announcement of election of members to Order of Coif.
Comments on Conference-Robert L. Stearns, President, University of Colorado.
Address-Albert C. Jacobs, Chancellor, University of
Denver.

Advisory Committee, Conference on Legal Education and
Admissions to the Bar:
Benjamin C. Hilliard

William Hedges Robinson, Jr.,

Chief Justice, Colorado
Supreme Court

Immediate Past President,
Colorado Bar Association

Orie L. Phillips,

Senior Judge, United States Court
of Appeals, Tenth Circuit

Robert L. Stearns,
President, University of Colorado

Committee on Arrangements:
Lawrence W. DeMuth
Horace B. Holmes,
Clyde 0. Martz
President Boulder County Bar
Association

Edward C. King,
Dean, School of Law,
University of Colorado

Albert R. Menard, Jr.
School of Law,
University of Colorado

Bennett Heads Larimer County Bar
At the annual meeting of the Larimer County Bar Association
in Ft. Collins, on March 7, the following were named as officers
for the ensuing year: Chester A. Bennett of Ft. Collins, president;
Conrad Ball of Loveland, vice-president; and William C. Stover
of Ft. Collins, secretary-treasurer.

